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I. INTERCONNECTION POLICY BEFORE 1996
The network effect in telephone service makes a larger system more
valuable to the consumer than a smaller system in the absence of
interconnection.I Interconnection with no settlement payments among
firms eliminates the network effect as a competitive factor and allows small
firms to compete with large firms. Although network effects were not
developed formally in the economics literature until the 1970s, nineteenth
century railroad, telegraph, and telephone executives recognized the critical
role of network effects in their strategic interactions with competitors. The
emergence of network effects in telephone competition has been a joint
product of technology and regulation. The characteristics of
interconnection requested by competitors of the dominant firm has changed
in a manner corresponding to the current technology. While public policy
toward interconnection has also evolved, there is no mechanism that
automatically adjusts the policy to changing technological requirements,
*Professor of Public Policy and Public Administration at The George Washington
University. Ph.D, Economics, and B.A., Applied Mathematics, Harvard University.
1. Network effects are often called economies of scale on the demand side. While
ordinary economies of scale provide a competitive advantage to the largest firms because of
lower unit costs compared to smaller firms, network effects also provide an advantage to the
largest firms because consumers place a higher value on a large network, allowing the
largest firms to charge higher prices than smaller firms for network subscription.
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and dominant firms can be expected to resist the extension of
interconnection policy to accommodate new technological requirements.
The earliest telephone competition after the fundamental AT&T
patent expired, occurred without interconnection, but the large number of
potential customers without telephone service and the short distance
covered by most telephone calls allowed both AT&T-controlled companies
and their competitors to flourish without interconnection. As AT&T
developed a monopoly long-distance network, its control of interconnection
between AT&T-controlled telephone companies and the long-distance
network became an important source of competitive advantage. The
antitrust settlement of 1913, the Kingsbury Commitment, provided the first
interconnection requirement, but also led to the end of effective
competition and the beginning of regulated monopoly.
During the regulated monopoly era, there were no competitive
interconnection requirements. AT&T controlled service on an "end-to-end"
basis and prohibited foreign attachments while interconnecting with
noncompetitive independent domestic telephone companies and with
foreign telephone companies that serve geographic areas separate from
those served by AT&T. The Communications Act of 1934 established a
"duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio.., in cases where the Commission, after
opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or desirable in the
public interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers ....,2
At the time that provision was passed, the relevant connections were
among carriers serving separate geographic territories, but the provision
stipulated a statutory basis for the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") to mandate interconnection when competition began.
Technological progress, especially the dramatic decline in the price of
electronic components, upset the established regulated monopoly industry
structure and price patterns during the 1970s. As entrepreneurs recognized
that the cost of providing both long-distance service and specialized
terminal equipment was below the price charged by AT&T, they attempted
to enter the industry in competition with AT&T. While the earliest privateline microwave systems operated without interconnection, most
competitive entries required some form of interconnection. Because
interconnection could only be required after opportunity for hearing when
the FCC found that interconnection was necessary or desirable in the public
interest, the early competitive interconnection requests were debated

2. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 201(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201).
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throughout many years of hearings on a wide range of specific issues. 3 The
FCC's grant of interconnection authority to specialized common carriers
created initial competition in long-distance private-line circuits that was
later extended to switched long-distance service. The FCC's Second
Computer Inquiry decision (Computer II) of 19804 established complete
interconnection rights between customer premises equipment and regulated
telephone networks. That decision also established the legal category of
"enhanced services" that would not be considered common carrier services
and therefore would not be subject to the interconnection requirements of
Section 201(a).5 However, enhanced services were expected to be
comprised of underlying common-carrier circuits and additional computer
enhancements; therefore, the basic communication circuits would remain
subject to common carrier requirements.
Dissatisfaction with the slow FCC resolution of early competitive
controversies caused the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to seek a more
comprehensive solution through its antitrust powers. The DOJ antitrust suit
was settled in early 1982 with the consent decree known as the
Modification of the Final Judgment ("MFJ")6 that required AT&T to divest
the Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"). The underlying premise of the
divestiture requirement was that local exchange telephone service
constituted a natural monopoly while long-distance service, customerpremises equipment, and information services were actually or potentially
competitive, and that the competitive problems were the result of AT&T's
incentives to resist interconnection with competitors. The divestiture
removed those incentives by separating the natural monopoly and
potentially competitive sectors of the industry and therefore created
incentives for the BOCs to seek interconnection with a wide range of
companies in order to provide services to their customers that they could
not provide on their own.

3. A detailed account of the early competitive efforts and associated interconnection
controversies can be found in numerous sources. See, e.g., GERALD W. BROCK,
TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR
COMPETITION, chs. 6-11 (1994).
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4. Second Computer Inquiry, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
5. The enhanced service category was developed to allow freedom for early data
communications carriers to experiment without regulatory constraints. Later, the Internet
was classified as an enhanced service and therefore developed outside of the common
carrier framework.
6. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.C. 1982), affd, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
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II. INTERCONNECTION AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
19967
As technological progress continued, dissatisfaction with the
divestiture agreement created pressure for policy change that contributed to
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"). 8 The post-divestiture
interconnection arrangements between local exchange carriers ("LECs")
and long-distance companies were implemented as a set of access charges
paid by long-distance companies to LECs for origination and termination
of calls. The structure and level of the access charges were regulated by the
FCC and were designed to retain aspects of the predivestiture subsidy flow
from long distance to local service. The design of access charges
effectively placed a very high price on the local call between a customer
and the service location of the long-distance carrier and created a strong
incentive to find alternatives to using the LEC for such subsidy-laden calls.
Bypass alternatives were legal but presumed difficult or impossible under
the divestiture reasoning.
Near the time of the divestiture, continuous reductions in the cost of
optical-fiber communications were making optical fiber an economical
replacement for earlier technologies on dense local and long-distance
communication routes. Fiber technology was relatively expensive per mile
installed, but carried such a high capacity that it was the least expensive
way to transfer high-density streams of data between two points. The
availability of optical-fiber technology and high access charges together
created a business opportunity for alternative local carriers in the central
business districts of major cities. Teleport Communications initiated a
specialized version of local competition in 1985 with a high-speed private
line "DS-3"--45 megabits per second-digital service interconnecting long
distance companies with major customers in Manhattan. Two years later
Metropolitan Fiber Systems began a similar service in Chicago, and those
two companies and others added short-distance optical-fiber services in
other major cities in subsequent years.
The first services provided by the new local competitors were not
interconnected with the local telephone company and were exempt from
state regulation because they were classified as interstate access. As the
companies developed, they sought interconnection with local telephone
companies, first to extend their private-line services to customers beyond
7. A more detailed version of the material in this section is contained in GERALD W.
BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION, ch. 14 (2003).

8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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their physical facilities and then to provide switched-telephone service. The
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") generally refused the requests
for interconnection or offered interconnection on terms considered onerous
by the new competitive companies. The resulting disputes were adjudicated
before the state regulatory commissions because the interconnection was
required in order to expand their service offerings from interstate access to
intrastate telephone service. Each state developed its own rules after
conducting a formal hearing, but the issues and arguments were similar
across states. New York and Illinois led the development of state regulatory
interconnection and pricing structures to facilitate local telephone
competition and several other states developed competitive frameworks
before 1996.
While the incipient local competitors were developing, the BOCs
were seeking freedom from the divestiture restrictions. The divestiture
theory required that the BOCs be restricted to providing natural monopoly
local-exchange service and prohibited from providing potentially
competitive services. The BOCs disagreed with the rationale for the
restrictions from the beginning and developed a sustained campaign to win
freedom to participate in any market. They sought relief from Judge
Greene-who had oversight of the MFJ agreement, from the FCC, and
from Congress. Beginning in 1986, several bills were introduced to relax or
remove the restrictions from the BOCs, but they did not pass. In 1993, a
bill was introduced to promote competition in the local exchange by
creating a federal policy on interconnection to replace the emerging
patchwork of state policies. The existence of some political support for
freeing the BOCs of their restriction to "monopoly" local exchange service
and of some political support for developing federal policies to further
reduce the monopoly characteristics of local exchange service provided the
opportunity for a political bargain, which combined elimination of the MFJ
restrictions with policies designed to eliminate monopoly power in the
local exchange. The general idea of such a bargain had wide support, but
the details and timing were matters of crucial importance to industry
participants, and extensive negotiations and political maneuvering preceded
the transformation of that general idea into the specific language of the
1996 Act.
The interconnection provisions of the 1996 Act were similar to the
provisions developed by the state regulatory commissions that had earlier
developed frameworks for local competition. The new interconnection
substantially strengthened the requirements of the
provisions
Communications Act of 1934. The new law established a general duty for
"each telecommunications carrier... to interconnect directly or indirectly
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9
with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers[,]"
instead of only requiring interconnection after a hearing that found such
interconnection to be in the public interest. More specific requirements
were imposed on ILECs, including the requirement that reciprocal
compensation for interconnecting carriers "provide for the mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport
and termination on each carrier's network facilities of calls that originate
on the network facilities of the other carrier[.]"' 10 The 1996 Act provided
that a telecommunications carrier seeking interconnection with an ILEC
should first attempt to negotiate a mutually satisfactory agreement, but that
if negotiations failed the dispute should be submitted to the state regulatory
commission for compulsory arbitration.
The interconnection provisions of the 1996 Act accelerated and
standardized the interconnection arrangements that were being developed
in the states at that time. However, they were a modest change from the
situation that would have existed if the 1996 Act had not been passed. The
1996 Act provided a general framework that was applicable to all states
rather than leaving it to each state to develop its own framework, but the
statutory framework left considerable freedom for the development of
alternative interconnection arrangements. Most interconnection agreements
were developed after arbitration by the relevant state commissions rather
than being negotiated voluntarily between the parties. Thus, the practical
effect of the federal interconnection requirements was to eliminate separate
state policies over the general approach to local competition while retaining
state regulatory control over the details of the interconnection agreements.
Because the details of the interconnection agreements were crucial to
competitive viability, the state commissions retained considerable control
over the competitive conditions within their state even after the 1996 Act
preempted their control over the general policy toward local competition.
The interconnection framework specified in the 1996 Act has
generally worked well and accomplished its goal of facilitating local
telephone competition. There have been many disputes and substantial
costs have been incurred litigating those disputes in state arbitrations, but
the implementation of interconnection for carriers with their own facilities
has been much smoother than the implementation of the unbundled
network element portion of the 1996 Act. The statutory requirement that
interconnecting carriers provide "mutual and reciprocal" recovery of costs
incurred in transporting traffic for each other has been interpreted as
requiring the same payment for each direction of traffic: if carrier A

9. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1).
10. Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).
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charges x cents per minute for terminating traffic received from carrier B,
then carrier B is entitled to x cents per minute for terminating traffic
received from carrier A. That provision simplified negotiations because the
level of the payment only matters for unbalanced traffic, and carriers have
some control over the balance of traffic. For example, the early local
competition generally showed more traffic flowing from competitors to
incumbents than from incumbents to competitors, and consequently,
incumbents sought relatively high payments for traffic terminated on behalf
of a competitor. Insofar as they were successful through negotiation or
arbitration in establishing a compensation rate above the true cost of
terminating traffic, that success created an incentive for the competitors to
seek out customers with large inbound volumes of traffic, reducing and
sometimes reversing the balance of traffic between the carriers. If neither
side can predict the balance of traffic, each will have an incentive to seek
either the true cost of terminating traffic-normally very low-or a zero
termination rate in order to save the transaction costs of measuring and
billing for traffic. In contrast, with unbundled network elements, the
incumbent always has an incentive to seek higher prices, and the entrant
always has an incentive to seek lower prices, leaving little opportunity for
voluntary agreement.
III. THE INTERNET AND INTERCONNECTION
The Internet was mentioned in the 1996 Act, but it was not a
significant focus except for provisions related to indecent content that were
later found unconstitutional.11 When the major portions of the 1996 Act
were passed in 1995, the Internet was a well-established academic
communications structure and was beginning its rapid growth as a
commercial communications structure, but the communications capacity
devoted to the Internet was a tiny fraction of the capacity devoted to
common carrier communications. Explosive growth in the Internet
occurred just after the 1996 Act was passed as the World Wide Web
addressing system and graphical browsers created a practical inexpensive
method of retrieving information. 12 Even as it became a major focus of
11. The Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 223, was a part of the
1996 Act; however, it was struck down in Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844
(1997), prompting Congress to pass the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), 47 U.S.C. §
231, which was also ruled unconstitutional by Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535
U.S. 564 (2002).
12. Netscape released the first commercial browser at the end of 1994, and Microsoft
released its first browser in the summer of 1995. Both companies made major improvements
to their browsers in 1996, and many other software tools to simplify the process of creating
and retrieving Web information were created at about the same time. See MICHAEL A.
CusuMANo & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNET TIME: LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE
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communication strategies, the lnternet continued as an unregulated Title I
service, exempt from interconnection, universal service, and other
requirements applied to common carriers, while also being classified as an
interstate service that was outside the jurisdiction of state regulatory
agencies.
The unregulated Internet has provided great freedom for innovation,
and Internet suppliers have voluntarily interconnected with each other. The
Internet has often been considered an example of the benefits of
unregulated competitive communication networks. However, as
convergence has allowed a wide range of formerly separate kinds of
communication to be transmitted as packets over the public Internet or over
combinations of dedicated and Internet facilities, strains in the unregulated
approach are appearing. The issues have been developed most clearly in
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoP") service. VolP encompasses
approaches to voice service ranging from pure Internet provision to service
using Internet Protocol ("IP") transmission but with ordinary telephone
handsets, numbering, and interconnection with other telephone providers.
VoIP has already attracted considerable policy attention for consideration
of 911 emergency access by VoIP users and law enforcement concerns, but
interconnection problems are likely to emerge in the near future.
If technology evolves to make VolP the dominant approach to
providing voice-telephone service, the current interconnection requirements
of the 1996 Act may be eroded away with detrimental effects on local
telephone competition. Most versions of VoIP need some combination of
elements from circuit-switched voice service and Internet service. If VolP
is classified in the same category as Internet service, it is an interstate
noncommon-carrier service and therefore exempt from the interconnection
requirements of the 1996 Act and exempt from requirements of state
regulatory agencies. Yet VoIP remains a communication service subject to
network externalities. For example, a VolP service provider that wishes to
offer its customers universal termination must be able to pass calls
originated from its customers to customers of other providers. A dominant
provider may have an incentive to refuse interconnection with competitive
VoIP providers and may be entitled to do so. So long as there are common
carrier competitive LECs who have interconnection agreements with the
dominant firm, the VolP provider can interconnect indirectly by making a
voluntary agreement with a circuit-switched telephone company and by
using that company as a transit point to the dominant firm. However, that is
only a temporary solution if, as it appears likely, VolP displaces circuitswitched technology. Thus, it may be necessary to revise and extend the
AND IS BATTLE WrrH MICROSOFT (1998).
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definitions of the interconnection requirements created by the 1996 Act in
order to continue their beneficial competitive effects.
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